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Abstract
While women’s share of employment has risen in many countries over the last two
decades, they are increasingly excluded from ‘good’ jobs in the industrial sector, and
gender job segregation has worsened. In this paper, the determinants of gender job
segregation are assessed using panel data for a broad set of developing countries covering
the period 1991-2015. The effect of gender job segregation on all workers, via the labour
share of income, is also analysed. The results identify two major contributors to gender
job segregation—the rising capital/labour ratio and the ratio of female/male labour force
participation rates—indicative of ‘crowding’ and exclusion as economies move up the
industrial ladder. The analysis further indicates that the crowding of women into lower
quality jobs has a negative effect on workers as a whole by dampening the labour share of
income. Those processes are influenced by global and macroeconomic conditions and
policies that have circumscribed the expansion of high-quality jobs relative to labour
supply, intensifying competition for ‘good’ jobs and weakening labour’s bargaining
power.
Key words: Dual labour markets, job segregation, gender, structural change, functional
distribution of income.

The Costs of Exclusion: Gender Job Segregation, Structural Change, and the
Labour Share of Income
INTRODUCTION
Equitable access to employment is a foundational requirement for inclusive growth, and
in particular, for gender equality. While global improvements in educational equality by
gender create the supply-side conditions for attaining this goal, the outcome is not
assured. The ability to translate a narrowing educational gap into employment equality
depends in part on processes of structural change and global macroeconomic conditions
that influence the level and structure of aggregate demand. The growth of inequality
within and between countries has, for example, dampened aggregate demand,
circumscribing the growth of high quality jobs relative to labour supply and relative to
job growth in other sectors (Alküz, 2017; Felipe et al., 2014).
This scarcity contributes to heightened competition for ‘good’ jobs, potentially
triggering opportunity hoarding by members of the dominant group who may emphasize
gender norms that privilege male access.1 As key players in the employment process,
firms may contribute to women’s exclusion from high-quality jobs for a variety of
motives: 1) employers may have formed faulty stereotypes about the relative
qualifications of female and male workers, 2) they may harbor concerns about the
negative effect of hiring women on productivity in male-dominated sectors, 3) they may
see occupational segregation as a mechanism for dividing workers by gender, thereby
reducing worker bargaining power and wages, and 4) insofar as this job hoarding occurs
in oligopolistic industries where firms earn rents that can be shared with workers, firms
may gain in terms of efficiency wage effects. Firms with preferences for male labour then
may act to exclude women from such jobs relative to men, with the result that women are
crowded into lower quality employment and/or unpaid work (Bergmann, 1974).
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Emerging research on the economics of identity underscores that opportunity hoarding and other
mechanisms that promote and reproduce stratification do not require collusion or collective action
(Darity et al., 2006; Davis 2015). Group identity formation reflects not how people behave in
groups but rather, how groups behave in people.
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Focusing on developing countries, we explore the period since the early 1990s,
and find that such a trend is taking place in developing countries.2 In particular, in many
developed and developing countries, women’s relative employment rates have risen. This
has occurred, however, in the context of declining male employment rates, rendering the
shift in women’s work roles potentially gender conflictive. Our results also highlight the
growing scarcity of high-quality work, with gender one of the ways in which economic
opportunity and security are rationed. The data provide evidence consistent with growing
job segregation whereby women are increasingly excluded from ‘good’ jobs in the
industrial sector.3
We econometrically analyze the determinants of increased gender job segregation
in developing countries, exploring the role of macro-level policies and structural change.
Further, we investigate the impact of gender job segregation on the labour share of
income and thus male workers. Anticipating the results, we find that modern processes of
structural change and the policies associated with globalization have failed to produce
sufficient high-quality jobs, with the result that women more than men are crowded into
low-quality employment. The results are consistent with economic stratification
processes whereby subordinate groups face exclusion from prized economic assets such
as good jobs, a tendency that is exacerbated under conditions of economic scarcity or
duress. We also find that that exclusion has a negative effect on the labour share of
income. Gender job segregation and inequality thus contribute to class inequality.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDERED LABOUR MARKETS
The economics of gender stratification
To understand gender employment dynamics in developing countries in the context of
globalization and structural change—in particular, how workers are allocated to various
sectors— requires an analytical framework able to explore the determinants of intergroup
inequality (also called horizontal inequality). A stratification framework offers this,
We begin in the early 1990s because gender-disaggregated employment data only became
widely available for developing countries beginning in 1991.
3
Jobs in the industrial sector (rather than agricultural or services sectors) are used as a proxy for
‘good’ jobs, for reasons outlined in Section III.
2
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linking the emphasis on processes of group and identity formation from sociology to
economic perspectives on (collective) self-interested behavior motivated by material
rewards.
Gender inequality results from systemic conditions that reproduce stratification
over time and are embedded in institutions. The system is buttressed by social and
psychological processes that construct gender roles in ways that economically advantage
men as a group relative to women. There are two primary mechanisms by which gender
(and other forms of) stratification is reproduced: exploitation and exclusion (TomascovicDevey, 2014). Exploitation is characterized by one group (women) being paid less than
the value of what it produces, relative to other workers. Women’s unpaid work as carers,
which supports the reproduction of human capacities essential to a functioning market
economy, is an example. The ‘crowding’ of women in labour-intensive export industries,
where firms’ greater mobility, and thus bargaining power, enables them to suppress
wages, bolstering profits and export competitiveness, is another example (Bergmann,
1974).
The second mechanism is exclusion or opportunity hoarding, whereby members
of the dominant group monopolize valuable positions or resources. In the labour market,
this may take the form of women’s exclusion from access to ‘good’ jobs that offer
conditions consistent with decent work. Opportunity hoarding intensifies when highquality jobs are in short supply, leading to rationing on the basis of social forces
(Smeeding, 2016). Exclusion is facilitated by norms (rules about appropriate behavior)
and stereotypes (generalizations about the behavior of group members) concerning the
suitability of different types of work for men and women, respectively, based on their
gender roles.4
Norms and stereotypes work to consolidate perceptions of group differences that
justify exclusion. In the case of gender, for example, a widely held norm is men are the
primary breadwinners while women should perform the bulk of unpaid caring labor.
Individuals tend to internalize norms, under the threat of disapproval or other social
consequences if they fail to conform to social expectations. Norms then create boundaries
4

Evidence of the universality of such norms can be found in the World Values Survey, although
there is variation between countries in the extent to which such norms prevail (Seguino, 2011).
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on behavior that can inhibit mobility. They also shape the perceptions of those who
control resources, such as employers. In the case of a dominant norm that women should
provide caring labour, for example, women are less likely to be hired for jobs in skill- and
capital-intensive industries that require on-the-job training, because firms may fear losing
the sunk costs of their investments in training. Instead, women are seen as ‘secondary’
wage earners, more appropriately suited to labour-intensive, low-skill, or high-turnover
jobs.
Examples of gender unequal stereotypes include the notion that men make better
leaders than women, and that women are more nurturing than men. Stereotypes need not
be accurate. Indeed, the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes is a mechanism for
perpetuating hierarchy, as these are internalized at the individual level. Widely held
gender stereotypes that suggest women are less suited for paid work due to their
responsibility for unpaid labour or their presumed lower skills promote structured
advantages for men, as women are rendered non-competing by such stereotypes.
Mechanisms of gender stratification provide a foundation for dual or segmented
labour markets, which allocate employment in ways that reflect and perpetuate prevailing
gender hierarchies both within and outside labour markets.
Dual labor markets
Theories of dual or segmented labour markets help to explain gender (and racial)
stratification within labour markets. Dual labour markets are comprised of two
technologically and institutionally distinct labour markets: the core and peripheral
sectors.5 These differ by wage-setting mechanisms and conditions of work. Dual labour
markets can be viewed as having a ‘glass wall’, with institutional practices and social
norms making it difficult to move from the peripheral to the core sector (Das, 2013).
Jobs in the core sector are highly coveted. They are more likely to be in the
formal sector of the economy where firms offer higher wages, various benefits, greater
5

Analyses of segmented labour markets often label the core sector the ‘primary’ sector, and the
peripheral sector the ‘secondary’ sector. Because the terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sectors
more typically refer to the agricultural/raw materials and manufacturing sectors respectively (with
‘tertiary’ referring to services), we use the terms ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ to differentiate between
the primary and secondary sectors of the labour market.
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job security, opportunities for job upgrading, and better-regulated working conditions.
Core sector firms often have market power, generating rents that can be shared with
workers, and offering higher wages relative to those in the peripheral sector. Higher
profitability also enables more investment, boosting productivity, further increasing the
gap between workers in the core and peripheral sectors (Gordon and Reich, 1982).
In contrast, jobs in the peripheral labour market are more insecure, intermittent,
and generally ‘dead-end’ with fewer opportunities for on-the-job training and upward
mobility. Firms in the peripheral sector tend to have little market power and thin profit
margins, which inhibits investments that raise productivity and wages. The peripheral
labour market in developing countries is comprised largely of informal service sector jobs
(more likely reflecting residual unemployment than remunerative work), as well as work
in agriculture and small-scale, often informal, manufacturing (Vanek et al., 2014).
The availability of, and thus access to, good jobs in the core sector depends first
and foremost on the structure of an economy. The processes of development linked to
industrialization, where economies of scale and scope promote more rapid productivity
growth, also hold promise for expanding opportunities in core sectors. While industrial
policies can facilitate structural change, macroeconomic conditions and policies also help
determine the availability of jobs in the core sector, including the level of demand and a
country’s trade and investment relations with the rest of the world.
In recent years, patterns of stalled industrialization or premature
deindustrialization have been observed in a number of developing countries, thus limiting
the growth of industrial sector jobs (UNCTAD, 2016). This suggests a relative
downsizing of the core sector. Research also shows that opportunity hoarding worsens
during times of economic hardship and insecurity (Darity et al., 2006). Consequently,
competition for the fewer jobs available is likely to intensify, triggering the forces of
stratification that influence job access. In well-paid jobs, such as in capital-intensive or
information technology industries, opportunity hoarding may be facilitated by stereotypes
portraying women as less technically adept than men, and therefore less qualified for
such positions.
Employers may also perpetuate stereotypes by ‘crowding’ women into jobs such
as in labour-intensive export manufacturing, as a means of depressing women’s wages
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and lowering export prices. For example, Elson and Pearson (1981) noted that women are
portrayed as having ‘nimble’ fingers, making them uniquely qualified for jobs in
assembly operations. It is more likely, however, that the desirability of women for these
jobs is related to their perceived docility in a sector where labour constitutes a large
proportion of total production costs.
Indeed, the profit motive may induce firms to actively engage in segregating
workers by race and gender, as a divided workforce would likely exhibit less solidarity
and thus have weaker bargaining power. Moreover, in segregated labour markets, men
are less likely to demand higher wages for fear of either losing their jobs or being
relegated to peripheral labour markets that offer the lower wages and poor working
conditions that women endure (Hartmann, 1979). Insofar as this dynamic is occurring,
there are also likely to be negative effects on the labour share of income resulting from
women’s exclusion from good jobs. This suggests that processes that contribute to gender
inequality in employment may also exacerbate class inequality.
GENDER TRENDS IN INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN EMPLOYMENT
Including women, excluding men?
An important determinant of gender equality in employment is equality in education.
Efforts over the past 25 years by national governments and international organizations to
close the gender-based education gap have resulted in significant progress (Seguino,
2016). The mean female/male ratio of average years of educational attainment in
developing countries, for example, rose from 71.9 to 86.1 per cent.6 Educational equality
is not sufficient to achieve gender equality in employment. Conditions must exist to
convert greater educational equality into comparable improvements in access to paid
work.

6

Authors’ calculations using Barro and Lee (2016); also note that country categories follow the
United Nations classification standard.
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Employment gaps have narrowed over the past two decades, although they remain
significantly wider than educational gaps. Figure 1 displays a kernel density function7
that shows the distribution of developing countries according to the ratio of women’s to
men’s employment-to-population rate (15 years and older), comparing 1991 and 2010. In
developing countries, the mean ratio rose from 57.1 per cent in 1991 to just 64.1 per cent
in 2010.
That women’s employment rates relative to men’s have been rising since 1991 is
a positive sign in terms of gender equality. Various push and pull factors have
contributed to this phenomenon. Women desire employment on its own merits, and also
because earning their own incomes outside the traditional family expands their choices in
a wide variety of areas. Indeed, a recent global survey found that 70 per cent of women
(and 66 per cent of men) interviewed would prefer that women work at paid jobs,
including a majority of the women not currently in paid employment (Gallup and
International Labour Organization [ILO], 2017). However, women may also be ‘pushed’
into employment as a result of the impact of global stagnation and unemployment on
men’s earnings, economic crises, cuts in public provisioning, or simply the increasing
commodification of daily life that accompanies globalization, regardless of level of
development. In these cases, women are said to engage in ‘distress’ sales of labor, to
buttress family income as male earnings decline and/or financial pressures increase.
These contradictory forces can be observed in Figure 2, which plots changes in
women’s employment rates relative to those of men over the period 1991 to 2014. Figure
2A shows this relationship by level of development, and Figure 2B by developing region.
In the majority of these countries, women’s relative employment rates rose at the same
time as men’s employment rates fell (the upper left quadrant in each figure), reflecting
potentially conflictive gender equality in the sense that improvements for women may
have been occurring in the context of declining job opportunities for men.8

7

This function is a smoothed histogram that represents a distribution of frequencies, where the
units of observation are country averages of the variable in question.
8
One potential problem with using men’s employment rates alone (instead of relative to women)
is that with development, men tend to stay in school longer and retire earlier, leading to a decline
in their employment rates. Although cross-country data limitations prevent restricting the sample

7

There are some notable differences by country grouping. Starting with the top
panel, 55.9 per cent of the sample is in the gender conflictive quadrant (see upper left),
with 64.7, 56.3 and 33.3 per cent of developed, developing, and transition economies,
respectively, in that quadrant. The widespread decline of men’s employment in
developed countries began even before the Great Recession of 2008 but was exacerbated
by that crisis. For transition economies, most have experienced declines in both women’s
and men’s employment over the period.
The lower panel shows developing-country differences by region. In the Asia
region, which has a large concentration of countries (44.1 per cent) in the ‘gender
conflictive’ quadrant (upper left), women gained at men’s expense. The rest of the region
shows a roughly even split between the upper right and lower left quadrants. In the Africa
region, 55 per cent of countries are located in the gender conflictive upper left quadrant,
with nearly two thirds witnessing declines in men’s employment. Some of these declines
were quite significant (for example, more than 5 percentage points in Kenya, Mauritius,
Nigeria, and South Africa). The vast majority of countries in the developing America
region (77.3 per cent) are in the upper left quadrant, with increases in women’s relative
employment as men’s employment declined.
While women’s employment has been rising in most countries (with some notable
exceptions) regardless of level of development, the associated improvement in gender
equality – as measured by women’s employment relative to men’s – has been partly driven by
substantial declines in men’s employment. And given the push and pull factors driving
women’s labour force participation, it is problematic that distress sales of labour might be
playing a role in what superficially appears to be greater gender equality in employment.
That is, women’s higher relative employment rates in a number of countries may be due not
to job competition between women and men, but rather, to women taking on inferior jobs
in order to maintain family incomes in response to men’s declining job opportunities and
slow wage growth. This highlights the importance of achieving inclusive gender equality, in
the sense of improvements for women not being at the expense of men. This partly depends
on the overall state of an economy. Increasing women’s employment participation without
to prime working age adults, available data indicate that limiting the sample by age does not
undermine the characterization highlighted in the text.
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addressing demand-side constraints, or acknowledging the widespread failure of growth –
when it occurs – to generate good jobs, will merely escalate labour market competition,
ultimately to the detriment of both women and men.
Industry and ‘good’ jobs
Although women’s relative employment has been rising in most developing countries,
their share of ‘good’ jobs has been falling. That is, during the past 25 years of growing
global integration, women have been increasingly excluded, as compared to men, from
prized jobs, even as their educational attainment and labour force participation have risen.
We identify jobs in the industrial sector as a proxy for ‘good’ jobs, as compared to
agricultural or services sector employment. The latter, in developing countries in
particular, is more likely to be informal work with lower productivity and thus wages.
Measures of decent work, as defined by the ILO, provide a good basis for
comparing the quality of employment in services and industry. Decent work is defined as
work that is productive, has workplace protections, and offers social protection and
prospects for individual development (such as skills upgrading). In the absence of an
international dataset on decent work opportunities by sector, a measure of relative job
quality can be calculated using the ratio of labour productivity in the services sector to
that in the industrial sector (Table 1). The rationale for this comparison is that higher
productivity measures are associated with greater remuneration and benefits.9 The data
indicate that services sector labour productivity is lower than industrial labour
productivity in developing regions (with ratios less than 1). The median for all nondeveloped regions is close to 0.75, suggesting that average productivity is roughly 25 per
cent lower in the services sector than the industrial sector.
Based on these data, for developing countries, there is a positive association
between the services sector’s relative productivity and the relative concentration of men
in that sector. That is, the higher the aggregate labour productivity in the services sector
relative to the industrial sector, the higher too is men’s concentration in that sector
9

This does not imply that industrial workers are more “productive” than services sector workers.
Indeed, for the services sector at least, productivity measures can be thought of more as a
consequence of wages than a cause.
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relative to women’s (with a correlation of 0.43 for the developing countries in the
sample).10 To the extent that these measures of relative productivity mirror relative
wages, this outcome is in line with the predictions about how gender stratification
manifests in dual labour markets: the better the jobs, the more likely it is that members of
the dominant group will ‘opportunity hoard’, and thus the less likely that members of the
subordinate group, in this case women, will have those jobs. Given that jobs in the
industrial sector are more likely to be part of the core labour market (that is, formal jobs
with associated benefits and protections) than jobs in the agricultural or services sectors,
we use relative access to industrial jobs as a proxy for gender employment equality.11
Women’s exclusion from ‘good’ jobs
The availability of industrial sector jobs has declined since the early 1990s. On average,
industrial sector employment as a percentage of total employment declined in all groups
of countries (Figure 3), a trend most pronounced in developed countries. Figure 4 shows
the distribution of countries in 2013 according to two ratios that compare women to men:
women’s employment-to-population rate relative to men’s, with a sample mean of 61.8
per cent; and the ratio of women’s concentration in industrial employment to men’s
concentration, with a sample mean of 47.2 per cent. The latter measure is referred to as
‘women’s relative concentration in industrial employment’ for the remainder of the
article, and it proxies for women’s relative access to good jobs.
As illustrated by Figure 4, women’s relative concentration in industry is much
lower (and more widely dispersed) on average than women’s relative employment
participation overall. This is evidenced by a decline in women’s relative employment
concentration in the industrial sector since 1991, from an average of 70.2 per cent in 1991
to 47.2 per cent in 2013 (Table 2). This phenomenon occurred in all developing-country
regions, with African countries showing the largest decline. Even in Asia, where
industrialization and export-oriented manufacturing have been more substantial, a decline

Authors’ calculations. See Table 1 for data sources.
Clearly, not all industrial sector jobs are ‘good’, especially the ones more likely to be held by
women. However, relative to most jobs in the agricultural or services sector, industrial sector jobs
are likely to be ‘better’, even when they are not that ‘good’.
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in women’s concentration in ‘good’ jobs in the industrial sector can be observed, despite
the increase in their relative share of employment overall.
Figure 5 contrasts trends in women’s relative employment and relative
concentration in industrial sector jobs for the period 1991 to 2013, using a kernel density
function with countries arrayed from lowest to highest shares. The modest progress
towards gender equality in employment ratios (illustrated by the mean change of plus 9.2
percentage points) stands in stark contrast to the retrogression in job integration in
industrial sector employment (with a mean change of minus 23.0 percentage points). The
significant decline in women’s relative concentration in industrial employment combined
with the decline in industrial sector employment overall (Figure 3) is indicative of a
process of job rationing influenced by gender.
Taken together, these figures indicate gender stratification in labour markets has
worsened, with women increasingly excluded from good jobs, and instead crowded into
work that is less remunerative and secure. Thus, contradictory forces appear to be at work
in developing-country labour markets: women’s increasing relative share of paid jobs, but
their growing exclusion from ‘good’ jobs, suggesting the crowding of women into poor
quality employment. This process has occurred in the context of the industrial sector’s
weakening role as a generator of high-quality employment, manifested as
deindustrialization in developed and middle-income economies and stalled
industrialization or premature deindustrialization in developing countries (UNCTAD,
2016).
The decline in women’s relative concentration may also be due to the changing
structure of the industrial sector itself, coupled with relatively rigid gender-differentiated
employment in that sector. As countries upgrade to more skill- or capital-intensive
production and away from labour-intensive production, it has been found that in the
manufacturing sector, a process of defeminization of employment has been occurring
since the mid-1980s (Kucera and Tejani, 2014; Tejani and Milberg, 2016).
There are several reasons why this maybe occurring. First, low wages are not an
important cost factor in capital-intensive industries, reducing the incentive for employers
to hire women workers. Second, insofar as firms make significant investments in human
capital to complement physical capital upgrading, employers may make hiring decisions
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on the basis of stereotypes about women’s and men’s roles in performing unpaid labor,
and therefore their long-term attachment to the labor force (with the assumption that
women are more likely to have work interruptions due to their disproportionate care
burdens). Finally, men may resist women’s employment in such jobs, seeing women as
lower status and therefore reducing the perception of job quality.
GENDER-BASED EXCLUSION IN THE CONTEXT OF STRUCTURAL
CHANGE, GLOBALIZATION, AND GROWTH
The Econometric Model
In this section, we develop an empirical model to better understand the determinants of
job competition and exclusion from industrial sector employment based on gender,
focusing primarily on developing countries. Our dependent variable is women’s relative
concentration in industrial sector jobs. Using cross-country time series data, we assess the
role of stratification in the context of four sets of structural factors: (i) structural
transformation and the inclusiveness of technological change, (ii) the structural and
policy consequences of hyperglobalization, (iii) overall growth, and (iv) changing
conditions on the supply side of the labour market.
To capture the dynamics of structural transformation, the model includes
industrial employment as a share of total employment and industrial value-added as a
share of GDP. Increases in either represent productivity-enhancing structural changes that
are a key source of catch-up development (UNCTAD, 2016). Their effects on
employment are, however, contradictory and therefore they need to be assessed
independently of each other. Specifically, while the growth of industrial value-added
suggests increased availability of good jobs, the consequent employment generated may
be insufficient to move much of the labour force into higher productivity (and paid)
work. Given the stratification dynamics discussed above, this sort of employment failure
would be expected to affect women more than men. Indeed, analyses of premature
deindustrialization and stalled industrialization suggest that it is the failure of the
industrial employment channel, and not the share of industrial value-added in GDP, that
poses the biggest challenge to inclusive growth (Felipe et al., 2014; UNCTAD, 2016).
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The model uses the capital-labour ratio as a proxy for technological
sophistication; an increase represents a shift towards more capital-intensive production.
As noted, a number of studies have linked defeminization of employment in
manufacturing in recent decades to processes of technological upgrading, even more so
than changes in trade. Given that the model controls for women’s education relative to
that of men (discussed under labour supply below), a negative association between
capital intensity and women’s relative concentration in industrial employment would
suggest a gender asymmetry in the employment costs of technological change.
The extent of global integration is measured by the shares of trade and FDI in
GDP. Most econometric studies measure trade by exports plus imports as a share of GDP,
but due to the increasing import content of exports among developing countries, such
measures can be misleading. What seems to matter more for growth and employment is
the value-added aspect of trade. Therefore, this model uses the share of net exports of
manufactures (exports less imports) in GDP as a proxy.12 The traditional association
between exports of manufactures and the feminization of industrial employment, at least
when the former is more labour-intensive, is often cited as a benefit of export-led growth
strategies. Similarly, to the extent that FDI is linked with exporting labour-intensive
manufactures, or more industrial activity overall, it could expand women’s relative access
to industrial employment.
While trade and FDI quantify the extent of an economy’s global integration, they
are not proxies for trade policy, as a variety of trade policies can coexist with high levels
of trade or FDI. Trade policy stance is therefore measured by applied tariffs weighted by
the share of product imports, with higher values indicative of less trade liberalization.13
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Many other measures of trade were also tried, including total trade, exports and then imports as
shares of GDP, but none were statistically or economically significant.
13
Lower income countries tend to have higher tariffs; thus a reasonable challenge to the
specification is whether coefficient estimates for tariffs are picking up per capita GDP effects. Per
capita GDP is not included in the model because of its high correlation with the capital-labour
ratio (0.80 for developed countries and 0.85 for developing countries). At the same time, the
correlation between the capital-labour ratio and weighted tariffs is quite low, at -0.17 for
developed countries and -0.19 for developing countries. If any variable is picking up the effects
of income, it is the capital-labour ratio.
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Fiscal policy stance is measured as the share of government consumption in GDP.
Given the prevalence of austerity in macro policy-making in most countries during the
period under study, and associated efforts to limit the size of government, it is important
to understand how public spending affects gender equality in employment. In many
developed countries, the public sector is a significant source of employment for women,
however, much of it in the services sector (Karamessini and Rubery, 2014). From a
development perspective, if public spending is associated with either more industrial
sector activity (perhaps as a result of implementing industrial policy or crowding in
private industrial investment more generally), or an easing of burdens on women’s
unpaid care through the provision of social or physical infrastructure, one would expect a
positive relationship between fiscal policy stance and women’s relative access to good
jobs.
Per capita GDP growth is included on the assumption that stronger growth should
ease job competition, with more women accessing higher quality jobs in industry.14 The
effects of growth, however, depend on its structure and the distribution of its benefits.
‘Jobless growth’, a challenge associated with recent growth trajectories for both
developed and developing countries, implies that growth may not alleviate gender-based
job competition.
The last set of variables are labour supply controls. Given that industrial sector
jobs tend to be more skill-intensive than other types of work, the model controls for
gender differences in education, measured as the ratio of women’s to men’s gross
secondary school enrollment rates. An increase in this ratio is expected to promote
women’s relative concentration in industrial sector employment. Further, women’s
relative concentration in industrial sector jobs will be affected by relative labor supply,
and we therefore control for the ratio of female to male labor force participation rates for
those 15 and over. A rise in that ratio signals an increase in the relative supply of
women’s labor with potentially positive effects on employment concentration in industry.
Econometric Strategy and Results
14

A number of other model variables are also likely to be correlated with growth, but the actual
statistical correlation is weak.
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Based on the above discussion, our estimated model, using fixed effects on a panel data
set that spans the time period 1991 to 2014 is:
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑!" = 𝛼 + 𝜇! + 𝛽! 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝!" + 𝛽! 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑎!" + 𝛽! 𝑘𝑙!" + 𝛽! 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑥!" + 𝛽! 𝐹𝐷𝐼!" +
𝛽! 𝑤𝑡!" + 𝛽! 𝑔𝑜𝑣!" + 𝛽! 𝑔𝑟!" + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑙𝑓!" + 𝛽!" 𝑟𝑒𝑑!" + 𝜀!"

(1)

where wind is women’s relative concentration in industrial sector jobs in country i at time
t, µ is the country fixed effect, indemp is industrial employment as a share of all
employment, indva is industry value-added as a share of GDP, kl is the capital-labour
ratio, netx is net manufactured exports as a share of GDP, FDI is net inward FDI flows as
a share of GDP, wt is weighted tariff rates, gov is government consumption as a share of
GDP, gr is per capita GDP growth, rlf is relative female/male labour force participation
rates, red is the ratio of female to male gross secondary school enrollment rates, and ε is
the error term. (Detailed data descriptions and sources are in the data appendix.) All
variables passed unit root tests except for employment variables, which could not be
tested because of gaps in the time series; therefore the specification has been modified to
include deterministic drift via the intercept term.
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis for the period 1991−2014, which
includes a set of three specifications each for developing and developed countries
separately as a number of the results differ significantly for the two groups.15 Columns
(1) and (2) include all the variables discussed above; columns (3) and (4) exclude per
capita GDP growth; and columns (5) and (6) exclude industrial value-added as a share of
GDP as well. The discussion focuses on developing countries, with the developedcountry results used primarily as a contrasting reference, and it takes the full model
(columns (1) and (2)) as the basis for calculating the magnitude of effects.
Because the variables are taken in log-log form, coefficient estimates can be
interpreted as the percentage change in women’s relative concentration in industrial
15

A statistical (Chow) test of the two models confirms that the two groups should be evaluated
separately. For the developing country group, many countries are missing a number of years; this
is particularly the case for the 1990s, so caution should be exercised in interpreting results.
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employment as a result of a one per cent increase in the independent variable in question,
with two exceptions: coefficients on per capita GDP growth and net manufacturing
exports as a share of GDP give the percentage change in women’s relative concentration
in industrial employment as a result of a one percentage point increase in either variable.
The discussion below focuses on the economic significance of the estimates by assessing
the impact of a variable’s average or mean change on women’s relative concentration in
industrial employment. Table 4 shows sample means and standard deviations; these will
be used, in combination with the coefficient estimates, to assess economic significance.
Beginning with structure, industrial employment – as opposed to industrial valueadded – is a statistically and economically significant positive correlate of women’s
relative concentration in industrial employment in developing countries. This association
holds across all models, regardless of whether a control for industrial value-added is
included. A one standard deviation increase from the mean in industrial employment as a
share of total employment (6.7 percentage points) is associated with a roughly 11 per cent
increase in women’s relative industrial employment. The coefficient on industrial valueadded in contrast is insignificant, underscoring the declining job yield associated with
current forms of industrialization that compromises the gender inclusiveness of growth
and development.
The strong cross-sample results on the capital-labour ratio confirm the point that
increases in capital intensity (and, by extension, improvements in average job quality) are
associated with relative employment losses for women in industry in both developing and
developed countries.16 For developing countries, a one standard deviation increase in the
capital-labour ratio, which almost doubles it, is associated with a 22.5 per cent decline in
women’s relative concentration in industrial employment.17
On the effects of global integration, estimates indicate FDI is not important in
influencing women’s relative access to good jobs. On the other hand, the extent of trade,
16

This association remains even if per capita GDP is included.
Including services sector productivity relative to industrial sector productivity in the regressions
does not substantially affect the estimates for developing countries; the coefficient estimate is
actually positive and statistically significant in the developed-country specifications. The likely
intuition is instructive: when services sector productivity is high, so is relative job quality,
attracting both women and men to that sector.
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as measured by net exports of manufactures, is positive and statistically and economically
significant, but only for developing countries. This is in line with the trade-related links
between export-oriented manufacturing and women’s employment. If an economy moves
one standard deviation above a zero trade balance on manufactures (plus 8.8 percentage
points), women’s relative concentration in industry increases 5.5 per cent. Other
measures of trade (total trade, or taking imports and exports separately) are not correlated
with significant changes in women’s relative access to industrial employment. What
seems to be more important is the extent of domestic value-added in trade in
manufactures. This casts doubt on the popularity of using participation in global value
chains (GVCs) as a proxy for successful globalization, or simply targeting women’s
involvement in GVCs as evidence of their greater inclusiveness in the benefits of trade.
Regarding weighted tariffs, this is one of the more robust positive correlates of
women’s relative concentration in industry. Increasing weighted tariffs by one standard
deviation from the mean (5.1 percentage points) is associated with a 4 per cent increase in
women’s relative concentration in industry. That less trade liberalization seems to be
associated with employment gains for women is not the same as saying trade per se is not
good for inclusive development. The extent of trade or global integration is distinct from
the policy environment that manages it. Less trade liberalization, especially in developing
countries, may in fact promote the expansion of domestic manufacturing, and thereby
women’s industrial employment. In contrast, unfettered import competition can
compromise local manufacturing and the job opportunities that go with it, with negative
consequences for gender equality.
The results show that, in developing countries, a stronger fiscal policy stance is
also associated with a higher share of women’s employment in industry relative to men’s.
If the developing country with the lowest value for government consumption as a share of
GDP (at 5 per cent) were to increase its government spending to reach the mean of the
developing-country sample (to 13.1 per cent), the associated increase in women’s relative
concentration in industrial employment would be 9.7 per cent. Running regressions
separately for the numerator and denominator, we find that relative shifts are driven by
gains for women, and not losses for men, when fiscal policy is expansive. This suggests
that government spending not only encourages more demand for labour in the industrial
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sector, but does so in ways that reduce job competition for jobs in that sector. These
relationships are only apparent in the developing-country sample.
Economic growth, on the other hand, is not a significant correlate nor does it
affect the magnitude and significance of the rest of the model’s coefficients when
dropped [see columns (3)–(6)]. Thus, growth does not appear to be an economically
important factor in determining women’s relative access to high-quality employment
based on its record over the past couple of decades. This result indicates that the failure
of growth to produce sufficient employment is also a failure for gender equality, and
confirms that simply targeting growth in the current global/macro context will not, on its
own, bring about inclusive development.
Regarding controls for labour supply, women’s relative secondary school
enrollment rates result in their higher relative concentration in the skilled work associated
with industrial sector jobs. The relationship is significant only for developed countries,
however. In contrast, the higher the ratio of women’s to men’s labour force participation
rates, the lower is women’s relative concentration in industrial sector employment. This
result is consistent with the segregation and crowding hypotheses discussed above: as
women’s participation in the labour force increases, they tend to be crowded into services
sector employment because their access to industrial sector jobs is blocked. Even though
only the developed-country specification achieves statistical significance, the result for
developing countries is economically significant: moving the sample average ratio of
61.0 per cent up by one standard deviation (plus 17.2 percentage points) is associated
with a decline of 13.2 per cent in women’s relative concentration in industrial
employment. This finding highlights the problem of exclusively supply-side oriented
calls for increasing women’s labour force participation as a source of both growth and
inclusivity. Increasing women’s labour force participation on its own – without
complementary policies that extend and structure aggregate demand in ways that spark
the growth of good jobs – tends to compromise women’s relative access to quality
employment.
In sum, the economically ‘largest’ factors explaining women’s relative
concentration in industrial employment are those relating to structural change and
technology. These offer evidence of a gender component to the literature on premature
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deindustrialization: as the availability of ‘good’ industrial sector jobs declines, the
consequent competition tends to be more costly for women’s industrial employment than
for men’s. Technological change and the increasing capital intensity of production are
particularly problematic for women, after controlling for gender differences in education.
An increase in employment opportunities in the industrial sector (as opposed to industrial
value-added) offers a gender inclusive alternative, but requires a sustainable expansion of
demand for industrial goods.
A similar point can be made with regard to globalization: higher net exports of
manufactures improve industrial job prospects for women, as do public policies that
provide some protection against import competition. An expansive fiscal policy also
contributes to inclusion by increasing labour demand in ways that reduce job
competition, thereby increasing women’s industrial employment but not at the expense of
men. Conversely, economic growth on its own is shown to have little impact on women’s
relative access to better jobs. Increasing women’s labour force participation without
supportive demand-side policies and structures to productively absorb these new market
entrants tends to worsen gender segregation and encourages the crowding of women into
low value-added informal service sector activities.
GENDERED EXCLUSION AND THE LABOUR SHARE OF INCOME
An important question is whether job segregation by gender has a negative impact on all
workers as reflected in the labour share of income. A number of studies point to the
negative impact of globalization and financialization on the labour share of income.18 The
question of how job segregation by gender – or its obverse, job integration by gender –
affects the functional distribution of income, however, has received relatively little
attention in the inequality, growth, and development literature, with the exception of a
handful of studies that have produced ambiguous results (Zacharias and Mahoney, 2009).
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See, for example, Stockhammer (2017).
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Given global evidence of gender wage gaps, an increase in women’s share of
employment in a sector may depress average wages in that sector.19 This suggests that
men may benefit from job segregation that excludes women from better-paid, maledominated sectors, providing an economic incentive for occupational hoarding. Job
segregation by gender, however, can also influence labour’s bargaining power overall.
Poor working conditions and remuneration associated with women’s jobs in the
peripheral sector may demonstrate to men of the ‘cost’ of job loss if they lose their
privileged positions in the core sector. This effectively weakens their fall-back positions
and bargaining power in the industrial sector, depressing wages and making it difficult
for workers to capture the benefits of any increase in productivity growth. These
dynamics can exert downward pressure on the labour share of income even though some
subgroups of workers maintain privileged positions relative to others.
This section provides an aggregate test of this latter proposition for developing
countries over the period 1991−2014. It follows the panel data frameworks found in the
few studies that econometrically evaluate the determinants of the labour share of income
for developing countries,20 and adds women’s relative concentration in industrial
employment as a variable that influences labour’s bargaining power. The analysis also
includes the ratio of women’s to men’s labour force participation rates to control for the
potential wage effects of the changing structure of the labour force as women (who are
systematically paid less than men) enter the labour market.
Control variables include the set used in the previous analysis to measure
structural transformation and the gender inclusivity of increasing capital intensity
(industrial value-added as a share of GDP, industrial employment as a share of total
employment, and the capital-labour ratio), as well as those used to measure the structural
and policy consequences of globalization (trade and FDI as shares of GDP, weighted
tariffs, and government consumption as a share of GDP). Real interest rates are a
standard in most specifications, and reflect the ability or willingness of governments to
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Indeed, one of the stylized facts of the literature on gender wage gaps in the United States and
in many other countries is that the higher the proportion of women in a sector, the lower is the
average wage (Lansky et al., 2016).
20
See, for example, Jayadev (2007) and Stockhammer (2017).
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maintain low interest rates in the context of the liberalization of global capital flows.21
The estimated equation is:
𝐿𝑆!" = 𝛼 + 𝜇! + 𝛽! 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽! 𝑟𝑙𝑓!" + 𝛽! 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝!" + 𝛽! 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑎!" + 𝛽! 𝑘𝑙!" +
𝛽! 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒!" + 𝛽! 𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽! 𝑤𝑡!" + 𝛽! 𝑔𝑜𝑣!" + 𝛽!" 𝑟𝑖𝑟!" + 𝜀!"

(2)

where LS is the labour share of income, trade is exports plus imports as a share of GDP,
rir is the real interest rate, and all other variables are as defined in equation (1).
Table 5 presents results and includes two specifications: fixed effects in column
(1) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) (also run with fixed effects) in column (2). The
latter specification accounts for the endogeneity of women’s relative concentration in
industrial employment; the excluded instruments used for the first stage are the lagged
value for women’s relative concentration and net manufacturing exports as a share of
GDP.22
Because the emphasis is on the relationship between gender equality in the labour
market and the labour share, the discussion is largely limited to these estimates. Many of
the regressors also determine women’s relative concentration in industrial employment,
and therefore the results in column (2), which account for this endogeneity, are used as
the basis for discussion. As with Table 3, all the variables (except for real interest rates)
are taken in logs, so that the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the percentage
change in the labour share of income that is associated with a one per cent increase in the
independent variable in question.
In both specifications listed in Table 5, women’s relative industrial concentration
(that is, increased job integration in the industrial sector) has a positive and statistically
21

Variables used by other studies that we do not incorporate, largely because of paucity of data,
include controls for labour market institutions and financial liberalization. Their absence is likely
taken up in the country fixed effects; however, including the Chinn-Ito index, a measure of
financial openness, gives negative but statistically insignificant correlations with the labour share,
and does not impact the other results (Chinn and Ito, 2008).
22 Further diagnostics for the 2SLS specification include the first stage F-statistic for excluded
instruments, which is applied to the null hypothesis that the model is under- or weakly identified;
this statistic surpasses commonly applied critical values. The P-value for the Hansen J test of
over-identifying restrictions indicates a failure to reject the null, implying that the instruments are
valid in the sense of being uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the
second stage equation.
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significant effect on the labour share of income. Thus, efforts to improve women’s access
to high-quality jobs in the industrial sector (and by extension reduce their crowding into
lower quality jobs) can be a win-win for both women and men. It can thereby reduce
gender conflict as women’s relative employment rises. To gain a sense of magnitude, and
using the estimates in column (2), between 1991 and 2013 the sample mean of women’s
relative concentration decreased from 67.2 to 48.4 per cent (as illustrated in Figure 5),
which was associated with a 3.8 per cent decline in the labour share. Considering that the
sample mean of the labour share of income declined by about 4 per cent between the
early 1990s and the late 2010s, the potential impact of changes in women’s relative share
of industrial employment was economically very significant by comparison.
Interestingly, the same change in the female-to-male (F/M) labour force
participation ratio (which increased by about 7 percentage points between 1991 and
2010) was associated with a decline in the labour share of about one per cent (which is
statistically insignificant). So while there is weak evidence of a negative association
between women’s increasing entry into the labour market and the labour share, when that
entry is associated with ‘good’ jobs, there is a net positive effect on the labour share of
income.
Among the controls for structural transformation, the only variable with a
substantial and statistically significant impact on the labour share of income is the share
of industrial value-added in GDP, which is strongly negative. A 10 per cent increase in
the share of industrial value-added in GDP (which would typically be a modest increase
from say 20 per cent to 22 per cent of GDP) is associated with a 2.6 per cent decline in
the labour share of income. The implication is industrialization on its own has not been
associated with better aggregate outcomes for workers in terms of the labour share in
national income. It is not enough for countries to industrialize; it has to be accompanied
by good jobs in order to improve overall conditions for labour. This highlights the
employment challenges associated with current processes of industrialization in
developing countries, and the increasing inequality that results.
By contrast, more expansive fiscal policies along with less trade liberalization are
associated with higher labour shares. And while none of the other measures of
globalization appear to be significant, it is worth noting that if one runs the regressions
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including either exports or imports as shares of GDP, exports exert the negative
correlation that appears for trade in column (1), and this persists if it is included on its
own in column (2), while imports as a share of GDP show no effect. These results are in
line with how one might expect global competition in export markets to exert downward
pressure on labour shares. 23
In sum, this analysis indicates that occupational hoarding by gender – as reflected
in women’s exclusion from industrial sector jobs and their crowding into lower quality
jobs – has a significant negative impact on the labour share of income. This class
dynamic is gender cooperative in that what is good for women workers is also good for
labour overall, including men.
CONCLUSIONS
This article illustrates how gender exclusion in the current global era follows prevailing
social norms and economic structures. In many countries, women’s employment
participation is increasing as that of men declines, and what appears to be more gender
equality is partly due to men’s loss of employment. Because the current era of growth and
globalization has failed to produce sufficient high-quality jobs, women have been
increasingly integrated into the labour market only on inferior terms, with gender
becoming one of the ways that economic opportunity and security are rationed. This
worsens overall inequality by lowering labour’s share of income, with negative
consequences for aggregate demand and, ultimately, growth.
This connection reveals how inequality can breed more inequality. The expanding
reach of markets, increasing global integration, and the structural changes that have
accompanied them have worsened conditions for labour. And gender has become an
unfortunate aspect of how inequality manifests and persists. The employment losses
associated with structural and technological change have been especially costly for
women’s access to the higher quality jobs associated with industrial sector work in
developing countries.

Full econometric results from disaggregating trade into exports and imports, not reported here,
are available on request.
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Policy can play a major role in reversing this development, however. On its own,
growth has not done much to improve gender inclusion in employment, partly because of
its failure to generate sufficient employment overall. On the question of trade, more is not
necessarily better. What matters is the extent of domestic value-added, at least in
manufacturing. Trade policy stances involving less liberalization of imports appear to
support women’s relative access to industrial work in ways that preserve men’s access to
employment as well, suggesting that managing trade can improve the gender inclusivity
of development.
Combating gender stereotypes and otherwise fostering and facilitating women’s
access to core sector employment, especially through social infrastructure investments
that better enable women to combine paid work and their responsibilities for care, are
important interventions to consider. Pairing such efforts with demand-side interventions,
including through more expansive fiscal stances, can increase the demand for labour and
make growth more gender inclusive. This would also improve economic prospects for
men.
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Table 1. Ratio of services sector to industrial sector labour productivity
Region
Mean
Median
Full sample
0.89
0.87
Developed countries
1.04
1.05
Developing countries
0.79
0.75
Africa
0.83
0.75
America
0.72
0.74
Asia
0.82
0.74
Transition economies
0.83
0.75
Notes: Sectoral productivities are calculated as the valueadded of sectoral output relative to the number of employees
in that sector; unweighted averages for country groups are for
the period 1991−2015.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the World Bank World
Development Indicators (WDI) and Penn World Tables
databases.

Table 2. Female to male employment rate ratios, and women’s relative concentration in
industrial employment, by developing region, 1991 and 2010 (per cent)
Relative
Ratio of women’s to
concentration of
men’s employment
women in industrial
Developing region
rates
employment
1991
2010
1991
2010
Africa
53.0
57.2
91.8
47.9
America
48.0
61.1
67.9
53.1
Asia
46.3
51.0
59.3
47.2
South Asia
42.0
46.7
63.8
40.8
East Asia
62.2
73.2
75.9
33.1
West Asia
25.2
28.0
22.1
36.5
South-East Asia
62.8
66.9
87.9
66.1
Note: The data are based on three-year averages.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ILO data, extracted from the World Bank, WDI database (accessed
15 February 2017).
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Table 3. Determinants of women’s relative access to ‘good’ jobs, developing and
developed countries
Dependent variable: Women’s relative concentration in industrial employment

Industrial emp./total
emp.
Industry valueadded/GDP

Developing
(1)

Developed
(2)

Developing
(3)

Developed
(4)

Developing
(5)

Developed
(6)

0.350*

-0.148
(0.171)

0.350*

-0.166

0.372**

-0.012

(0.180)

(0.168)

(0.164)

(0.127)

0.101

0.229

(0.133)

(0.138)

-0.198***
(0.063)

-0.284**

-0.200***

-0.297***

-0.218***

(0.111)

(0.063)

(0.098)

(0.064)

-0.001
(0.002)

0.006*

-0.001

0.0067**

-0.001

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

-0.001

0.006

-0.003

0.005

(0.025)

(0.004)

(0.024)

(0.005)

0.087***
(0.018)

0.062**

0.087***

0.064**

0.081***

(0.029)

(0.018)

(0.028)

(0.019)

0.046
(0.115)

0.153*

0.003

0.144*

-0.051

(0.079)

(0.101)

(0.079)

(0.084)

-0.468

-0.984**

-0.437

-0.947**

(0.333)

(0.401)

(0.335)

(0.351)

(0.180)
0.099
(0.138)
-0.283**

Capital-labour ratio
Net manufacturing
exports/GDP

(0.110)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.001

Inward FDI/GDP

(0.024)
0.062**

Weighted tariff
Government
consumption/GDP
Per capita GDP
growth
Female/male labour
force participation
Female/Male
secondary school
enrollment

(0.028)
0.156*
(0.080)
0.0003
(0.003)
-0.468
(0.334)

0.217
(0.143)

0.0035
(0.005)

0.003
(0.002)
-0.952**
(0.404)

0.191

0.387**

0.190

0.395**

0.200

0.379**

(0.295)

(0.185)

(0.293)

(0.189)

(0.268)

(0.176)

Observations
437
599
437
602
443
653
R-squared
0.267
0.728
0.267
0.728
0.277
0.742
F-stat
8.41
66.24
9.35
54.51
9.16
56.84
Number of countries
61
33
61
33
62
34
Notes: All variables except for net exports of manufactures as a share of GDP and per capita GDP growth are
measured in logs. All regressions are based on annual observations for the period 1991−2014, and include country
fixed effects; constants are not reported. Robust standard errors, all of which are clustered by country, are shown in
parentheses. Including time dummies for the Asian financial crisis and the most recent global financial crisis of
2008-2009 does not affect the results. Further details on data are provided in the data appendix. Statistical
significance is indicated as follows: *10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 1 per cent.
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Table 4. Sample mean and standard deviations, developing and developed countries
Developing countries
Developed countries
Standard
deviation

Mean

Mean

Standard
deviation

Relative female/male industrial emp.

56.85

25.92

42.50

12.80

Industrial emp./total emp.

21.72

6.65

28.06

5.79

Industry value-added/GDP

32.63

11.62

29.12

5.40

$90,796

$72,191

$275,771

$96,748

-8.70

8.81

-2.03

8.58

3.13

2.80

4.94

7.43

7.85

5.05

2.44

1.73

13.13

3.61

19.50

2.91

Capital-labour ratio
Net exports of manufactures/GDP
Inward FDI/GDP
Weighted tariffs
Government consumption/GDP
Per capita GDP growth

2.74

3.56

2.21

3.39

Female/male labour force participation

61.01

17.19

81.88

8.30

Female/male secondary school enrollment

101.57

12.88

101.34

4.93

Source: See the data appendix.
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Table 5. Determinants of labour share of income
Dependent variable: Labour share of income
Fixed effects
(1)

Two-stage least squares
(2)

Women’s relative concentration in
industrial employment

0.080**
(0.037)

0.137**
(0.055)

Female/male labour force participation

-0.154
(0.100)

-0.091
(0.107)

Industrial emp./total emp.

-0.021
(0.051)

0.042
(0.052)

Industrial value-added/GDP

-0.183*
(0.092)

-0.258***
(0.086)

Capital-labour ratio

0.033
(0.064)

0.071
(0.066)

Trade/GDP

-0.037
(0.024)

-0.004
(0.004)

Inward FDI/GDP

-0.005
(0.004)

-0.025
(0.024)

Weighted tariffs

0.036**
(0.016)

0.039**
(0.016)

Government consumption/GDP

0.157***
(0.055)

0.173***
(0.058)

0.0003
(0.001)

0.0002
(0.001)

Real interest rates

Observations
469
421
R-squared
0.446
0.481
F-stat
4.9
4.7
F-stat for excluded instruments
95.07
P value, Hansen J
0.280
Number of countries
48
48
Notes: All variables except for real interest rates are measured in logs; see Table 6 for additional notes.
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 1 per cent.
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Figure 1. Distribution of women’s to men’s employment-to-population rates in the
population 15 years and older
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Note: See Figure 1A.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ILO modelled employment data.
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Figure 2. Changes in women’s/men’s employment rates versus men’s employment rates,
1991-2014 (percentage points)
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Note: Employment rates refer to the proportion of the wage-earning population, aged 15 years and
older. Changes are percentage point changes in 3-year average values. The horizontal axis in Panel B
figure is different than that used on Panel A to better illustrate regional differences.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on ILO modelled employment rates.

33

15

20

25

30

35

Figure 3. Trends in industrial employment as a share of total employment, 1991-2014
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Note: Values refer to the unweighted average by year for country group, which is
consistent across years.
Source: Same as Figure 2.
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Figure 4. Distribution of developing countries by women’s to men’s economy-wide
employment rates and shares of industrial sector jobs, 2013
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Note: Women’s relative concentration is calculated as three-year average of the share of women
employed in the industrial sector relative to men’s share.
Source: Same as Figure 2.
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Figure 5. Change in women’s relative concentration in industrial employment and total
employment in developing countries, 1991- 2013
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Note: Women’s relative concentration is calculated as three-year average of the share of women
employed in the industrial sector relative to men’s share. Developing country group is consistent
across Figures 4 and 5, and differs from the (larger) group illustrated in Figure 1, as the current
group is limited to countries for which there is data on women’s industrial share of employment
across in the particular years considered.
Source: Same as Figure 2.
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DATA APPENDIX
Variable

Relative
women’s/men’s
industrial emp.

Industrial emp./total
emp.
Industry valueadded/GDP

Code

Explanation

wind

Women’s relative concentration in
industrial employment, which equals
(women’s industrial
employment/women’s total
employment)/(men’s industrial
employment/men’s total employment)

Calculations based
on WDI database
and ILO modelled
estimates.

Industrial employment as a share of
total employment (per cent)

Calculation based on
WDI database

Industry value-added as a share of
GDP (Percent)

WDI database
Calculated based on
Penn World Tables
9.0

indemp

indva

Source

Capital-labour ratio

kl

Capital stock at constant 2011 national
prices (in 2011 dollars) divided by
total employment

Per capita GDP
growth

gr

Annual per capita GDP growth based
on real local currency (per cent)

WDI database

Net manufacturing
exports/GDP

netx

Manufacturing exports less
manufacturing imports as a share of
GDP (per cent)

Calculation based on
UN Comtrade and
WDI databases.

Trade/GDP

trade

Exports plus imports as a share of
GDP.

Calculation based on
UN Comtrade and
WDI databases.

Weighted mean of applied tariff rate,
all products (per cent), taken at the 2digit HS level.

Calculated based on
the UNCTAD Trade
Analysis Infornation
System (TRAINS)
database

Weighted tariff

wt

Inward FDI/GDP

FDI

Net FDI inflows as a share of GDP
(per cent)

WDI database

Government
consumption/GDP

gov

General government final
consumption expenditure as a share of
GDP (per cent)

WDI database
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Variable

Code

Explanation

Source

F/M labour force
participation

rlf

Ratio of women’s to men’s labour
force participation rates, in the
population aged 15-64 years (per cent)

Calculation based on
WDI database and
modelled ILO
estimates

F/M secondary
school enrollment

red

Ratio of women’s to men’s gross
secondary school enrollment rates (per
cent)

Calculation based on
WDI database

Labour share of
income

LS

Share of labour compensation,
including estimates for the selfemployed, in national income

Penn World Tables
9.0

Real interest rate

rir

Real interest rate (percent)

WDI database

Note: WDI database accessed December 2016.
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